Research Fellow, European University Institute
↓ Download CVI am a Research Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence. I obtained my PhD from the Central European University in Comparative Politics. In my research, I ask the question under what conditions democratic accountability, representation, and resilience holds or collapses. I focus on the role of citizens, civil servants, politicians and parties. I approach these questions through group psychology and group behavior, and affective and informational biases. I specialize in survey and experimental techniques. When out of the office, I am a serious hobby cyclist and a nature enthusiast.
Substance regulation in the United States is in a crisis. This report explores whether seemingly misaligned policies contradict public preferences or reflect biased citizen opinions. Using survey data (N=5,053) we show that policy outcomes align with public opinion. We further demonstrate that regulatory preferences are driven by status quo bias: support for the legality of legal substances exceeds that for hypothetical drugs with corresponding properties (∆median drug = 23.75, 95% CI [20.73, 27.18]), while the opposite holds for illegal drugs (∆median drug = 12.90, 95% CI [-15.79, -10.51]). Randomly assigning individuals to information about harm attenuates the status quo bias in the case of legal substances (∆median drug = −17.70, 95% CI[-21.47,-13.93]), but not for illegal ones. We discuss limits on public control over drug policies.
A startling feature of the countless recent sex scandals involving politicians has been the almost complete lack of public apologies. This note explores the electoral incentives politicians face when crafting communication strategies in the aftermath of sex scandals. We focus on two communication strategies – denials and apologies – and assess their impact on incumbent support across a wide range of scandals that vary in terms of the seriousness of the charges as well as the availability of evidence. Using data from a series of survey experiments, including over 10,000 respondents we find that citizens punish incumbents who apologize, even in the case of accusations that appear the least serious in the eyes of voters. Moreover, apologies fail to generate political support compared to denials, even in cases when voters are exposed to evidence. This suggests that in most cases apologies are simply not politically viable communication strategies.
To what extent can opposition parties in hybrid regimes persuade voters? Although door-to-door campaigning is a frequently used technique by parties, we lack scholarly evidence on their effectiveness in mobilizing voters — especially in nondemocratic contexts. In electoral autocracies, on-the-ground campaigns might prove especially important due to the inequality between parties' media access and resources. In this study, we estimate the impact of a Hungarian opposition party's canvassing efforts for the 2019 European Parliament election relying on granular data and precise information about how party activists were allocated to geographical units. We find that the party's campaign led to a roughly 1-percentage point (about 15% of the standard deviation) increase compared to its previous vote share. At the same time, we also demonstrate that the campaign seemed to hurt other opposition parties instead of the governing party, highlighting the possible challenges that opposition parties face in electoral autocracies.
How do election outcomes shape partisan affective polarization? Drawing on theories of group identity, I examine how winning or losing elections affects partisan attitudes. Election outcomes can change partisans' perceived out-group threat and in-group status at the same time. These mechanisms lead to ambivalent predictions for the affective polarization of both winners and losers. In a series of randomized survey experiments from the United States (n = 7,188), I measure in- and out-party attitudes before and after hypothetical scenarios of election outcomes. I find no evidence that losing elections increases affective polarization. While losers' out-party evaluations remain stable, winners show warmer in-party feelings. This suggests that elections lead to winner gratification rather than loser backlash. These findings challenge common concerns about the losers' consent in democracies — at least when it comes to the emotional effects of election outcomes among the mass public.
We examine whether electing female leaders increases women's political engagement. While existing research emphasizes descriptive representation's effects on attitudes and stated preferences, little is known about behavioral outcomes. Using a unique dataset from Slovakia, we measure women's actual civic participation in a granular and continuous fashion via the online platform Odkaz pre starostu, where citizens report local issues (N = 92,493). We infer user gender through an established machine classification method, leveraging the fact that most users use real names. Applying a regression discontinuity in time design, we examine the effect of Zuzana Čaputová's 2019 election as Slovakia's first female president on the baseline gender gap in problem reports. Our results reveal a roughly 10 percentage-point rise in the weekly share of female submissions immediately after the election. These findings provide rare behavioral evidence that descriptive representation can foster political engagement.
Citizens are often regarded as the ultimate guardians of democracy, yet questions remain about their ability and willingness to fulfill this role. Citizens may ignore, forget, or fail to encounter information about subversion – especially because many backsliding democracies are characterized by media capture, polarized media environments, political alienation and apathy. Are citizens aware of various democratic norms and institutions come under attack? This study shifts the focus to granular perceptions about the norms of electoral democracy as a critical component of democratic commitment employing Hungary as a critical case of a backsliding democracy. We translate V-Dem's all 23 subjective indicators of electoral democracy into accessible items and ask respondents to evaluate their country's democratic standing using a representative survey (N = 1187). We explore whether these assessments align with expert evaluations and how partisan identity, affective polarization, and demographic variables shape perceptions. We also quantify how each of these indicators contribute to perceptions of the country's democraticness in general. Our findings show that on average citizens are fairly close to experts on most democratic indicators. Low education, being opposed to the government, and being affectively polarized increase the odds that a respondent underestimate the quality of democracy in Hungary.
I evaluate the ecological validity of the common in-group theory on affective polarization. Cultivating partisans' shared identities has proven to reduce out-party animosity. However, most of this evidence comes from experimental settings with known limitations. Instead, I test the theory in everyday settings, through the impact of banal signals of common identity: I exploit the regular occurrence of national football games as a form of common in-group priming. I observe these events in England where football is both extremely popular and relevant for national identity. For data, I search for overlaps between the timing of voter survey data collections and international football competitions. I estimate the generalized effect of 37 games on the out-party attitudes of partisans in a multi-event regression discontinuity design (N=129,639). I show that the games are associated with a weak and short-lived decrease in out-party animosity. The results contribute to the policy discussion about the scalability of affective polarization interventions to the society.
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